President Trump has stated that he has begun to work with Russian President Vladimir Putin to put an end the war between Ukraine and Russia “immediately.” Yet to do so, he will need to think and act outside the stereotypes of narrow neo-conservative and neo-liberal thinking that have governed the post-Cold War era.
Trump has warned that if there was not a ceasefire deal soon, he would “have no other choice” but to impose tariffs, taxes and sanctions on “anything being sold by Russia to the United States, and various other participating countries.”
“We can do it the easy way, or the hard way — and the easy way is always better,” he continued. “It is time to ‘Make a deal.’ No more lives should be lost!”
If he takes the hard path, Trump could use his newfound U.S. strategic leverage in global energy markets. He could exert a number of tougher non-military sanctions and pressures, such as placing tighter LNG sanctions on Russia, that risk further escalation.
If he takes a softer path, Trump could promise sanctions relief for Russia as a bargaining chip in ceasefire and peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. And if Kyiv resists, the U.S. could threaten to reduce military and/or financial assistance.
It appears unlikely that the softer approach of sanctions relief will be able to convince Moscow to halt its war. Moscow is going to play hardball unless the U.S. takes steps to redefine the entire NATO-Russian relationship and acts to ensure the establishment of a non-aligned, non-nuclear Ukraine.
The U.S. has backed itself into a corner by pressing for an open-ended NATO enlargement since the end of the Cold War, based on the false claim that NATO was “the only game in town.” Contrary to the blithe optimism of the Clinton and subsequent administrations, it was evident that NATO enlargement would provoke a Russian backlash at some point in the future; this was forewarned by the founders of the U.S. policy of Cold War containment, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, among others, who argued against the open-ended NATO expansion.
To save face, without necessarily admitting that it was wrong to expand NATO, the U.S. could argue that there has not been sufficient consensus within Ukraine itself to join NATO. When Ukraine first declared independence in 1991, it had declared itself as neutral. Then it entered into a very uncivilized divorce with the Russian Federation, in which both Washington and Moscow (rightfully) pressed Kyiv in 1994 to give up the nuclear weapons left on Ukrainian territory after Soviet collapse.
Washington can now propose that there are other ways to bring the U.S., Europeans, Ukraine and Russia into a non-threatening, and more productive, collaboration: by the establishment of a neutral, nonnuclear Ukraine. There are viable security alternatives for Ukraine ― other than joining NATO or deploying nuclear weapons ― as proffered by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
To reach a sustainable peace, the U.S. should coordinate with the major and regional powers most impacted by the Russia-Ukraine war in both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to show both Moscow and Kyiv that continued conflict is unproductive, while concessions would bring mutual benefits. Trump will need the support of India, Turkey, Brazil, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, among other powers. Working with Beijing is essential due to its political and economic influence on Moscow.
Switzerland, Slovakia and Serbia, as well as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have all been considered as possible hosts for bilateral peace talks between Trump and Putin. Any of these states could also play a role in different dimensions of the multilateral negotiation process involving disputes with respect to Baltic states, the Russian Kaliningrad, Transnistria and Moldova, for example, in addition to Ukraine.
A ceasefire must keep open the possibility of eventual territorial compromises after Moscow has seized some 20 percent of Ukrainian territory. For its part, Kyiv has shown a capability to pressure Russian naval power in Crimea and the Sea of Azov, in addition to thus far holding Russian territory in the Kursk oblast. While it is not realistic for Ukraine to return to its pre-2014 borders, if negotiations go well, it may nevertheless prove possible to engage in territorial exchanges, as Zelenskyy has suggested.
To achieve sustainable peace going beyond a ceasefire would require the deployment of international peacekeeping forces (acceptable to both Kyiv and Moscow, of course) from non-aligned states, such as India, South Africa, Turkey, Brazil or Saudi Arabia, or more neutral European states including Hungary, Slovakia and Italy. These non-threatening peacekeepers should oversee force withdrawals, prisoner exchanges, buffer zones, and ceasefire enforcement, under a general United Nations or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mandate.
A peace settlement should eventually allow for future territorial compromises, and could eventually involve shared or international sovereignty over contested areas. International development and energy projects in the Black Sea region ― including U.S., European, Russian, Chinese, Indian and other investments in both rare earth and critical raw materials ― could help support war reparations, peacekeeping and reconstruction.
Simultaneously, with international forces and some European forces deployed in Ukraine, Washington and Moscow should seek to reshape European and global security cooperation and begin to establish confidence and security building measures throughout all of eastern Europe, if not in other conflict zones.
Washington and Moscow should begin serious discussions on how future strategic arms deals could include all forms of U.S. and Russian weaponry. They should also discuss a “transparency mechanism” to meet Russian concerns with the deployment of U.S.-NATO missile defenses and other NATO military infrastructure.
The possibility of joint U.S.-Russian controls over Missile Defense systems, as discussed by former President Obama, should also be reconsidered. One of the goals should be reductions of ICBMs, as well as the elimination of intermediate and short-range nuclear weapons, as the latter are war fighting weapons.
The promise of Ukrainian neutrality, accompanied by deployments of international peacekeeping forces and European and global arms accords, can serve as incentives for Russia to end the war. For its part, Kyiv would obtain strong security guarantees from the U.S., Europeans and other states in backing the deployment international peacekeepers in key regions of contention ― until, and if, both Moscow and Kyiv can negotiate a full settlement.
By leveraging diplomacy, economic incentives, international development projects and security guarantees involving both European and non-European peacekeepers, it could prove possible for the Trump administration to broker a sustainable peace that stabilizes a neutral, non-nuclear Ukraine, reshapes NATO-Russia relations, and establishes a new global security architecture.
Only a sustainable Ukraine-Russia peace settlement can prevent this conflict from dragging NATO and Russia into direct confrontation.
Hall Gardner is professor emeritus of the History and Politics Department of the American University of Paris. He is the author of “Toward an Alternative Transatlantic Strategy,” “World War Trump” and “Crimea, Global Rivalry and the Vengeance of History.”
