The imploding relationship between Ukraine and the United States has upended global politics. Ukrainian forces are still slogging it out against Russian invaders without U.S. intelligence and weapons deliveries, even as President Trump tries to halt Moscow’s attacks with threats of tariffs and new sanctions. The Europeans are trying to cobble together alternatives to American assistance, and even some of Donald Trump’s greatest admirers, like Nigel Farage and Giorgia Meloni, are aghast at American actions.
This is all part of breaking up the current version of the American-led international order, which many Trump supporters think is long overdue. As Marco Rubio said before the meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky, “the big story of the 21st century is going to be U.S.-Chinese relations,” and “it’s not a good outcome for America or for Europe or the world” if “the Russians are permanently a junior partner to China.” In Asia, which will ultimately feel the effects of this change as much as Europe, each country’s reaction depends on its view of American leadership.
China also wants to tear down the international order, but they want to replace it with a Chinese model rather than an American update. For Beijing, war in Eastern Europe is not so bad if the Europeans don’t rouse themselves. Watching America’s partners expend American munitions on Russian targets without replacing them is far better than staring down those same weapons across the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing is relishing the growing divide between the United States and its European allies too. Chinese envoy Lu Shaye said, “the Trump administration has implemented a brazen and domineering policy towards Europe … honestly, from a European perspective, it’s quite appalling.” He encouraged the Europeans to “reflect on this and compare the Trump administration’s policies with those of the Chinese government.”
Trump’s Ukraine maneuvers, however, could result in less Chinese influence. The Ukraine mineral deal could reduce Chinese economic leverage over the United States. Since Beijing is as eager to turn other countries into dependent serfs as Trump is to make America’s allies more self-reliant, Xi Jinping would not like a Russo-American thaw any more than he liked North Korea’s closer collaboration with Russia.
America’s most formidable ally in Asia, Japan, is more troubled. Japan is building up its military largely to maintain the American-led order. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said last week that Europe’s security is “inseparable” from Asia’s, and that what happens in Ukraine today could occur in Asia tomorrow. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces rely on American support to function well, so as one cabinet member said, Trump’s treatment of Ukraine “is unbearable when you think about Asia.”
Tokyo also tried to flip Russia and got burned. Former prime minister Shinzo Abe spent years hoping to reach an accommodation with Russia and negotiate a treaty to formally end World War II. His attempts to keep Russia and China apart came up short though, and now Russian and Chinese forces routinely menace Japan.
Even talking about pulling a “reverse Nixon” brings up bad memories there. Contrary to popular belief, Richard Nixon did not engineer a split between the Soviets and Chinese, who had already fought battles over their disputed border years before Henry Kissinger’s first secret visit to China. Even so, the Nixon administration surprised Japan when it publicly announced the opening, so Japan sees this less as a strategic masterstroke than a painful betrayal.
In India, meanwhile, few tears will be shed at the funeral of any American-led international order. It has never been, or sought to be, closely integrated in the American security and economic system, and like the European Union it would rather be America’s equal than its junior partner. Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said this week that the United States “is moving towards multipolarity, and that is something that suits India.”
A rapprochement between America and Russia would also be a godsend for India. Two years ago, Jaishankar pointed out, “for us, there are three big Eurasian powers, Russia, China, and India.” India’s goal is to form a majority out of those three, which will be easier with U.S. backing. Many Indians also hope that the United States will overlook Iran’s “death to America” fixation and make up, and it is not clear which aspiration is more realistic.
The arms and intelligence suspensions in Ukraine will confirm Indian suspicions about the United States. Indians carefully track American criticisms of their religious freedom and human rights records. New Delhi wants American weapons, which Ukraine has shown are often better than Russian equivalents, but not if Washington could cut them off for human rights or other reasons. An Indian military that diversifies its purchases and is less effective weakens the balance of power in Asia.
Trump’s calculation is that he can tear down the existing order and rebuild it to suit his preferences faster than the Chinese or others can. This week, he fired the pistol, and it’s off to the races.
