It is no secret that Donald Trump has long admired Russian President Vladimir Putin. Over the past five weeks, his administration has made moves pleasing to the Kremlin, from endorsing Moscow’s positions for settling the Russia-Ukraine war to opposing language critical of Russia at the United Nations.
On Tuesday, Putin told Trump he could agree to a halt on Russia and Ukraine attacking the other’s energy infrastructure. He did not agree to the U.S. proposal for a broad and immediate ceasefire. Nevertheless, the White House’s upbeat readout on the call said the two leaders agreed that an improved bilateral U.S.-Russia relationship “has a huge upside.”
But what “huge upside” would that secure for the United States and Americans?
Some suggest Trump has a geopolitical motive, that is, by throwing Ukraine under the bus and engaging less with U.S. allies in Europe, he seeks to bond with Putin and pull him away from Chinese President Xi Jinping. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has discussed such an objective.
If true, the Trump administration grossly misunderstands the Putin-Xi relationship. They have declared a partnership “with no limits.” Putin’s Russia depends on China. He will not jettison Xi for Trump, who is unpredictable and will not be in office in four years.
If Washington follows this course, it will lead to a predictable result. In a couple of years, the United States would face a China-Russia tandem, but with fewer allies and friends. If Trump were to leave Europe to fend for itself with Russia, he could hardly expect the Europeans to respond to American requests for support in dealing with China.
Another goal might focus on nuclear arms control and proliferation. Trump told the January World Economic Forum that “we’d like to see denuclearization.” True, a better relationship might lead to a resumption of the talks on strategic stability and nuclear risk that broke down after Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine.
However, would new talks succeed? In 2020, Trump asked the Russians to limit non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, but Moscow staunchly resisted that. The Russians would almost certainly press for limits on missile defense. That would affect Trump’s “Golden Dome.” His administration made clear in his first term that it would accept no negotiated constraints on missile defense. A new arms negotiation likely would quickly bog down in such differences.
As for nuclear proliferation, North Korea, which steadily expanded its nuclear and missile programs despite Kim Jong-un’s “beautiful letters” to Trump, and Iran, which sits on the threshold of becoming a nuclear weapons state, pose the two biggest concerns. The Kremlin may well have leverage with them, but Putin won’t pressure either given the weapons and soldiers they provided for his war against Ukraine.
Another goal might be reopening economic relations. At the February Jeddah meeting between Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, businessman Kirill Dmitriev accompanied Lavrov and claimed American companies lost $324 billion by leaving Russia three years ago. But that number seems squirrely. Russia’s gross domestic product the past three years totals about $6.5 trillion. Could U.S. firms really have made up the equivalent of 5 percent of Russia’s GDP? Really?
The reality reflects that Russia never offered U.S. exporters a major market. In the best of trade times, 2012-2014, U.S. exports to Russia topped out at $11 billion per year. For perspective, total global American exports in 2013 came to $1.6 trillion. Eleven billion is a rounding error.
Dmitriev also suggested lucrative oil and gas concessions for American companies. Before the Trump administration gets too wide-eyed, it ought to check with veterans of the George W. Bush administration. Bush and Putin agreed that U.S.-Russia energy cooperation was an “area of great promise.” When it came to U.S. energy companies concluding deals, however, not much got done. Russia’s investment climate and stringent rules offered little encouragement, and the Russian state today dominates the economy more than it did 20 years ago. By the way, any increase in Russian energy exports could compete with U.S. exports.
This is not to argue against better management of the U.S.-Russia nuclear competition. That would be sensible and useful in any event. But why attach such priority to improving the overall relationship with Russia before the Kremlin changes its destructive policies, first and foremost by demonstrating it is prepared to live in peace with its neighbors and not threaten or assault their sovereignty and territorial integrity?
Trump should take a realistic view of what the U.S. might gain in return for normalizing relations with Russia. In the near term, the concrete results look meager at best, illusory at worst. They hardly justify a U.S. turn away from Ukraine and Europe.
Steven Pifer, an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, is a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer and former ambassador to Ukraine.
