In the wake of Syria’s over-decade-long war, a new battle has emerged.
Just weeks after dropping bombs on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Islamist fighters overthrowing the Assad regime, Russia is jousting with the West to engage with the new HTS-led government in Damascus. The pace of Russia’s reversal on HTS, which it has long designated a terrorist organization, has been swift.
While Russian state-media continues to decry Damascus’s new leaders as extremist jihadists, the State Duma passed a law allowing Russian courts to suspend terrorist designations. The law opens a pathway for Russian normalization with HTS, an initiative now heralded by Ramzan Kadyrov, the Vladimir Putin-allied head of Chechnya.
The Kremlin’s motivation? Two long-standing Russian military bases in Syria that have become vital to an increasingly adventurist Moscow.
Putin has not made these intentions secret. In his annual end-of-year news conference, Putin made clear that Russia was actively negotiating with HTS to keep control of its naval base in Tartus and its airbase in Latakia. If Washington slow-walks engagement with Damascus, the U.S. risks allowing Putin to get the best foot forward as the power vacuum in Syria is filled.
Washington need not give Damascus’s new Islamist leaders immediate carte blanche. However, without any meaningful direct engagement, the U.S. provides little incentive for HTS to prioritize American geopolitical interests over Russia’s.
The co-authors of the most recent congressional sanctions legislation targeting the former Assad regime, Rep. Brendan Boyle, chair of the Free Syria Caucus, and Rep. Joe Wilson, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, penned a letter outlining a new Syria strategy in the days following the fall of Assad. They urged Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and national security adviser Jake Sullivan to adopt a phased approach to sanctions relief, aimed at pushing the new HTS-led government in Damascus to comply with international norms. The congressmen promote the plan as a way to facilitate international investment and the reconstruction of Syria, while prioritizing U.S. security interests.
HTS has taken over a Syria devastated by years of indiscriminate Assad regime and Russian bombing that simply cannot be rebuilt without foreign relief. The incentive structure laid out by Boyle and Wilson, backed by American economic power, would leave crippled and overstretched Russia with a weak hand to negotiate for its bases on the Syrian coast. So far, Russia has only meagerly offered to use the bases as a means to deploy humanitarian aid.
The impact of locking out Moscow from its bases in Syria would be felt in geopolitical arenas beyond the Middle East — especially in Ukraine and across Africa, where Russia is directly competing against U.S. interests.
The U.S. stands to reap the benefits from any and all disruptions to Russia’s expansionist activity.
Amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Tartus naval base has afforded Moscow a vital pressure point in the Mediterranean on NATO’s southern flank. Russian vessels have used the base as refuge from Ukrainian drones that have targeted and successfully sunk Russian naval assets in the Black Sea.
The Khmeimim airbase in Latakia has been a lifeline for Russia’s expanding influence in Africa, from Libya to several sub-Saharan countries, as a hub for personnel deployment and resupply. Without the base, Russia will likely be forced to upgrade its military presence and infrastructure in Libya.
The Kremlin is acutely aware of what it stands to lose if it fails to come out on top in the fight to engage with the new Syrian government — the 49-year Assad-granted leases on their military bases could be moot on the whim of HTS. Washington would be remiss to not take quick advantage of the opportunity to snub Russia’s global influence.
Kareem Rifai is a Syrian-American graduate student at the Georgetown Security Studies program.
