As Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds on, the question of Europe’s long-term security order looms larger than ever — can there be stability with Russia, or must the continent prepare for permanent confrontation?
A recent contention asserts that Europe needs new security architecture that includes Russia. Yet, the pre-war era is replete with Western states having offered Russia a seat at the table, like turning the G7 into the G8. The NATO-Russia Council was set up to take the relationship between NATO states and Russia to a qualitatively new level. Unlike other post-Soviet states who received nothing similar, NATO has consistently tried to integrate Russia into Western security architecture.
In the run-up to the war, the Kremlin demanded NATO retreat to its 1997 borders — and if reports are to believed, Russian representatives asked the same in Riyadh last week. While this may be a negotiating stance, its repetition points to Russia advocating for a sphere-of-influence. This is not to say that a constructive debate should not be had on the shared neighborhood, but current Russian regime perceives that it and other great powers can block policies that they do not agree with.
A framework that gives Russia a prominent position either in a new forum or the re-establishment of an old structure is unpalatable after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, based not on geopolitical concerns but on delusions of grandeur and identity. Realpolitik calls to integrate Russia within Western security to limit a Russo-Chinese alliance miss how tied the Russian economy is to China or the personal closeness between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Such claims also miss how tied the Kremlin is into its confrontation with the West.
Although Russian society may want peace, the Kremlin’s personalist autocratic model does not need to take public opinion into account as extensively as Western governments do. Control of the narrative allows the Kremlin to shape public perceptions and play on existing beliefs in Russian society that Russia only fights defensive wars.
The Russian economy is doing better than often portrayed and the Russian military is on a crash course of further military build-up. Having seen that nuclear blackmail works, the Kremlin will look to use it again. Thus, it is a question of when, not if. The only question is, increasingly, where.
Having seen that Western governments balk at nuclear threats, knowing that Europe is essentially leaderless and unprepared to defend itself, the Kremlin could decide that Russian speakers in, say, Estonia need protection. This hypothetical scenario would see Russian soldiers intervene in Narva declaring their role to defend ethnic Russians; because this is an existential issue, Russia will use all means to defend these co-nationals should external forces intervene.
Changing Western security frameworks to include Russia will not make the West safe. It would only lead to spheres-of-influence, confirm to the Kremlin that the West is weak and give Russia a say over that architecture. The Kremlin has long used methods to weaken the European Union and NATO, and even at the table the Kremlin would look to dominate any organization or make the new security architecture unworkable.
The Kremlin relies on signals to calibrate its reaction. Changing existing security architecture would go beyond the Kremlin’s wildest dreams. Rather than be placated, the Kremlin would see this as weakness and demand more. The correct signal to send would be for Western states to show leadership.
European states must be seen to do more, and quickly. There are ways out of this predicament.
First, European leaders will have to charm President Trump by buying more American weaponry and liquefied natural gas and by showing that Europe’s buying of American weaponry will lead to American jobs. Another option would be to lobby Congress. Europe could pay for the maintenance of American bases in Europe, thereby incentivizing America to stay on the continent.
Secondly, there is signaling. European countries will have to begin significant military investment. Increasing defense spending to 3 percent would be a good start, although this should move higher to 3.5 percent in five years. This would show Trump that Europe is following his radical reorientation of NATO and taking their responsibilities seriously, thereby allowing Trump to claim he has fixed NATO. The EU must help invest in European arms production to speed up military production.
Such action may be sufficient to keep America in Europe and allow for America to be a backstop to Europe’s frontline status. This military shift would send a signal to Russia that Europe is prepared and able, and would allow America to concentrate on its rivalry with China. The designation of finances for military build-up would improve Western security and help Ukraine.
Until Putin leaves the Kremlin, the only way to ensure Western security is for Europe to do more — ideally supported by America.
Stephen G. F. Hall is an assistant professor at the University of Bath who lectures on Russian and Post-Soviet Politics.
