The undersea cable network, the unseen backbone of global communications, carries 95 percent of international data, including financial transactions, military communications and internet connectivity. Despite its vital role, this infrastructure is both vulnerable and poorly defended, lying exposed on the ocean floor and shielded primarily by its obscurity.
Recent incidents in the Baltic Sea and near Taiwan have underscored the risks, with evidence suggesting that powers such as Russia and China may be testing the West’s resolve to protect these critical lifelines.
Last month, two undersea cables in the Baltic were severed, disrupting communication between Finland and Germany as well as between Sweden and Lithuania. Suspicion has fallen on the Chinese-flagged bulk carrier boat Yi Peng 3, which was reportedly dragging its anchor across the seabed near the cables while transporting Russian cargo. Investigators believe this may have been an act of sabotage involving tacit cooperation between Beijing and Moscow.
Meanwhile, in Asia, undersea cable disruptions near Taiwan have raised concerns that China could be probing vulnerabilities in anticipation of a potential crisis.
These developments should not lead the West to panic or overreact. While the growing threat to undersea cables is real, it is neither insurmountable nor requires a dramatic escalation of tension. Instead, a measured response is needed that strengthens resilience without adding fuel to an already volatile geopolitical environment.
The risks stem from two primary sources. First, Russia has been steadily expanding its undersea capabilities, deploying specialized submarines designed to tap or sever cables as part of its hybrid warfare strategy. NATO has reported increased Russian activity near critical cable routes in the North Atlantic and Arctic, heightening concerns about potential sabotage during a crisis.
Second, China’s approach is more subtle but equally concerning. Chinese companies have embedded themselves in global cable construction and maintenance, raising fears of espionage and covert manipulation. The Baltic incident involving a Chinese vessel suggests a willingness to test boundaries, especially in collaboration with Russia.
While these actions are troubling, they do not represent an existential threat to Western security — at least not yet. What they do highlight is the need for a strategic response that balances the imperative to secure infrastructure with the need to avoid unnecessary escalation. Such a measured approach is both realistic and aligned with the West’s long-term interests.
The first step is to enhance monitoring and surveillance of undersea cable networks. This does not require a massive militarization of the seabed but rather targeted investments in technology to detect and respond to suspicious activity. Unmanned underwater vehicles, acoustic sensors and satellite imaging can all play a role in improving situational awareness. Enhanced monitoring is a low-cost, high-reward strategy that signals vigilance without provoking further tensions.
At the same time, the West must prioritize redundancy and diversification in its cable infrastructure. Building additional routes and exploring complementary technologies such as advanced satellite communications can mitigate the effect of any single point of failure. These measures are not about outpacing adversaries in an arms race but ensuring resilience in the face of potential disruptions. A diversified network is harder to target and more likely to withstand attempts at sabotage.
Equally important is the need for stronger regulatory oversight of undersea cable projects, particularly those involving foreign firms with ties to adversarial governments. Private companies own and operate most of the world’s cables, but leaving such critical infrastructure entirely to market forces is not tenable. Governments must strike a balance, ensuring security without stifling innovation or alienating partners. Transparency in ownership and operation is key, as is greater collaboration between public and private sectors to address vulnerabilities.
Critics may argue that these steps risk inflaming already high tensions with Russia and China, but the opposite is true. A prudent, defensive strategy is far less likely to provoke confrontation than inaction or overreaction. By addressing vulnerabilities calmly and deliberately, the West can signal that it takes the threat seriously without playing into narratives of aggression or paranoia.
It is worth noting that not every disruption or cable break constitutes an act of sabotage. The seabed is a crowded and dynamic environment. Natural events, fishing activities and accidents all pose risks to undersea infrastructure. While vigilance is necessary, it must be coupled with restraint. Over-attribution of blame or a rush to militarize cable security could exacerbate tensions unnecessarily, especially in regions where geopolitical rivalries are already sharp.
The West must also resist the temptation to frame every challenge to its infrastructure as a zero-sum confrontation. Realist strategy calls for clear-eyed assessments of threats, but also emphasizes proportionality and prudence. Russia and China are undoubtedly testing the West’s resolve, but that does not mean they are preparing for imminent conflict. A restrained response that strengthens defenses without escalating rhetoric or actions is not just the most sustainable course — it is the wisest.
Undersea cables are a symbol of the interconnectedness that defines the modern world. Protecting them is not just a matter of national security but of preserving the stability of the global system. While the risks are growing, the solutions are within reach.
By acting prudently — enhancing monitoring, diversifying infrastructure and tightening oversight — the West can address this challenge without overreacting or undermining its broader strategic goals. Resilience and restraint are not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing.
Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn., a senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities in Washington, D.C.
