In December, when the German government led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz lost the confidence of the Bundestag, it sparked a general election. It also provoked the fear of a deepening international crisis on top of the domestic one.
Between Russian President Vladimir Putin’s growing aggression and the change to a new and more volatile U.S. administration, the news of another divisive German election was greeted with deep concern.
By the time the election results were announced, transatlantic tensions had increased, as it became increasingly apparent that President Trump did not share the view of a united front between the U.S. and Europe on halting Putin’s aggression. Trump began to impose tariffs on European goods, thereby threatening the recovery of an already underperforming economy.
The results of the German election should be greeted with a mixture of relief and grave concern. The relief is because, despite the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany or AfD Party, it is still not in a position to win elections or prevent the largest parties from forming a governing coalition without it.
But AfD, some of whose members have been associated with neo-Nazis, managed more than 10 million votes (over 20 percent of the total), despite having normalized and legitimized extreme anti-immigration and national-chauvinistic rhetoric. In light of the country’s history, this is an uncomfortable development.
For now, this party, along with some of its more repulsive policies, will remain in opposition. Germany is likely to be governed, once again, by a grand coalition of the center-right CDU-CSU and the defeated Social Democratic Party, along with the support of a number of smaller parties. The CDU-CSU, led by the presumed next German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, won the most seats, with 28.5 percent of the vote. The SDP, led by the exiting chancellor Scholz, came in third with just 16.4 percent of the vote
The AfD being held at arm’s length from a position of power should not lull anyone into a false sense of security. The symbolism, let alone the tangible threat, of the rise of a party with such an overt anti-minority stance — its co-leader, Alexander Gauland, has vowed, for example, to fight against “an invasion of foreigners” into Germany — should not escape us.
It is hardly a consolation that nearly 80 percent of Germans rejected the AfD’s policies, because the party’s share of the vote continues to increase from election to election, legitimizing its vile ideas. The fact that it is disproportionately supported by young, very angry, men (mainly from the former East Germany) could ensure its longevity in politics, unless the reasons for its emerging strength are addressed.
Hence, it is dangerous to ignore Merz’s warnings that the rise of the AfD is a “final warning” to democratic parties — and that internationally, the continent is facing its “five minutes to midnight” moment, with shifting geopolitics and a possible weakening of the transatlantic alliance with the U.S. under Trump.
It is not enough to be appalled by the AfD’s platform. It is imperative that the reasons be addressed for the division between the former East and West Germanies and the anger of young male voters. To some extent, this is just a matter of “It’s the economy, stupid.” Nevertheless, Germany’s mainstream parties must challenge the ability of the nationalist-reductionist-nativist right wing to lay upon Muslim migrants almost the entire blame for their country’s stagnating economy.
Germany’s economy has long performed poorly. After experiencing the economic “miracle” of the post-war years, it now has one of the slowest growth rates in the EU — expected to be a mere 0.7 percent this year after two consecutive years in which the economy contracted. Most experts highlight structural weaknesses, such as high energy costs, low public investment, and an overreliance on exports as the main causes of this slowdown, in addition to an export-driven economy and an aging population.
None of that is linked to immigration. Indeed, in some instances, it suggests there is a need to allow more foreign workers into the country. The divide between Germany’s east and west also indicates that more than 35 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and huge investments in efforts to bring about a more cohesive and equal society across the country, old divisions continue to run deep. The new government will have to concentrate not only on improving the economy but also on improving democratic discourse.
If preserving Germany’s cohesion is a massive job, keeping Europe together, with a common foreign and security policy, is much larger. For obvious historical reasons, but increasingly as a matter of German convenience, when it comes to foreign and security policies, Germany has punched below its weight. Its defense expenditure is lower than that of most other NATO and EU countries, standing at just 1.6 percent of gross domestic product.
If Merz wishes to be true to his commitment that his “absolute priority” is to strengthen European security, he will have to find the money to do that. This, by itself, will be a tough task in an economy that is not growing and where there is the need to work within the country’s budgetary straitjacket, which limits new borrowing to 0.35 percent of GDP.
Merz has made it clear he has two massive battles on his hands. One is to lead the fight against the rise of the far right both in Germany and in Europe at large. The second and equally challenging task is to take the lead on European security in the face of a U.S. administration that seems prepared to put the continent at risk with its overtures to Putin’s Russia.
How his new government manages to cope with these twin challenges will define Germany, its prosperity and European security for many decades to come. It may also redefine Europe as an entity quite distinct from its alliance with the U.S. and at the forefront of efforts to fortify liberal democracies.
Imran Khalid is a physician and has a master’s degree in international relations.
