In his victory speech, President-elect Trump declared, “I’m not going to start a war; I’ll stop wars.” The situation in Israel or Ukraine wasn’t explicitly mentioned in his words, but you could almost feel the winds in Jerusalem and Kyiv blowing stronger during that moment.
It doesn’t take a genius to assume that the 47th President wants things to de-escalate in both regions. But while the Ukraine-Russia war seems to become more complex by the day, the dynamic on Israel’s fronts is different, particularly with Lebanon and the emerging cease-fire agreement, which the current U.S. administration grooms.
Regarding this arena, the will of the future White House could materialize sooner rather than later. However, if it continues on the current track, it could be easily missed.
After more than a year of constant fighting, the potential tranquillity on the Israel-Lebanon border is something to be welcomed. Too many Israelis were killed and terrorized by Hezbollah. An unimaginable number of Lebanese feel unsafe in their own country. Both people wish for a day on which southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut aren’t used as a clash point between Israel and a terror organization.
In this sense, the translation of Israel’s military operation against Hezbollah into a possible political act provides hope for many. From a geopolitical viewpoint, it signals the desired evolution from war to diplomacy.
For millions in the region, the relation between the two phases isn’t just an academic axiom but an essential symbiosis. Tranquilly is good for the economy. It’s vital for the human soul and body. And when life gets back on track, it’s almost tempting to wonder how it didn’t come before.
The leaked details from the emerging cease-fire agreement embody those hopes. However, while the media and public discourse naturally focus on the practical arrangements it entails, they are not the main thing. Political developments, strategic considerations and future leaks will likely change them and bring new directions.
The common denominator between the clauses, however, is what we should look at. At its core is the assumption that Lebanon can fulfill its obligations. This is a problematic assumption because, in recent years, Lebanon has become no longer just “a struggling country.” It is a nation that experiences a genuine crisis in almost every possible aspect.
According to a new World Bank report from May this year, poverty in Lebanon “has more than tripled over the past decade, reaching 44 percent of the total population.” Many households have adopted “a variety of coping strategies, including cutting back on food consumption and … reducing health expenditures, with likely severe long-term consequences.”
The U.S. government ranks Lebanon at 139th place in the ranking of countries concerning GDP per capita for 2023. In its 2024 analysis of GDP, the International Monetary Fund doesn’t even mention Lebanon. And the dysfunctionality of the political system only intensifies these financial challenges. There has been no president since October 2022, while the current government is an interim one since the failure to form a permanent coalition following the May 2022 elections.
Interestingly, though, lack of money isn’t necessarily the problem here. Following the 2006 War between Israel and Lebanon and until 2022, the U.S. administration has invested a substantial amount of $3 billion in the Lebanese Armed Forces to ensure it can apply sovereignty in the southern part of the country and act as a stabilizing force. That didn’t enable nor encourage it to counter Hezbollah and help Lebanon get on the right track.
One of the reasons was the fear of breaking the country’s gentle social fabric and leading to a civil war. And since about 50 percent of the LAF combat workforce are Shia who sympathize with Hezbollah, the reality on the eve of the current war was of collaboration between the two.
The LAF enabled the terror group to use its military infrastructures to spy on Israel Defense Forces soldiers and assist in concealing Hezbollah’s illegal military activity in south Lebanon. The price is being paid by the Lebanese people.
This is just one example to illustrate that Lebanon’s financial hardships are symptoms of a much deeper, rooted problem. They result from decades of shaky social cohesion, alarming corruption and mismanagement, which created a fertile ground for an Iranian takeover of land and political institutions. This means the emerging cease-fire agreement should be an annex to another, wider one.
An agreement in which the axis of countries designed to ensure security south of the Litany will undertake to assist in the rehabilitation of an entity that was once one of the pearls of the Middle East and today looks like its own shell.
The materialization of such a plan may be based on the spirit of Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for the respect of Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty and the end of foreign presence and militias in the country.
Practically, such a rehabilitation process must neutralize Iran’s influence on Lebanon and the LAF, including an institutional refusal to misuse ground crossing and the Hariri airport for smuggling Iranian soldiers and arms. It shall also be conditioned in a clear Lebanese denunciation and demilitarisation of Hezbollah as part of an effective monitoring process to ensure its inability to recover.
Alongside security, it needs to hold a solid financial element and direct a long-term economic plan based on strategic partnerships with allies who wish to see Lebanese prosperity, not control its assets. It could also insert accountability and sanctions mechanisms to prevent corruptive forces from taking advantage of Lebanese aid yet again.
Most importantly, it has to entail an honest realization that the future cease-fire agreement won’t magically solve the problem, as social processes take years.
The current clash between Israel and Hezbollah may set the conditions for such a move. As of writing these lines, over 160 commanders have been killed in Hezbollah, including senior members of its leadership. This means that a significant obstacle that prevented Lebanon from applying sovereignty in parts of its southern territory is gradually removed.
But it is only the starting point, not the end. As the current cease-fire agreement is being negotiated, its content needs to express an understanding of the complex situation of Lebanon as a country and apply strategic rehabilitation mechanisms accordingly.
Learning from past mistakes will not only prevent the next war with Israel. It will set Lebanon free.
Gadi Ezra is Israel’s former director of the National Public Diplomacy Unit and the author of “11 Days in Gaza” (Yedioth Books, Hebrew). Sarit Zehavi is the founder and President of the Alma Research and Education Center, which specializes in Israel’s security challenges on its northern borders
