As the U.S. election nears, China appears to have little preference between Trump and Harris. Their main difference lies not in the fundamentals of their China policy, but in how they might carry it out.
China’s approach could be summarized as calibrating its strategies to account for the leader in the Oval Office in the areas of economy, foreign policy and Taiwan.
Generally, China would likely prefer Harris to win. If Harris were elected, she would probably continue Biden’s approach, promoting a targeted “de-risking” or “decoupling” strategy in trade and technology, tightening export controls and investment reviews concerning China, and accelerating supply chain realignment among allies.
But like Biden, Harris would likely not pursue complete decoupling from China. Given China’s deep integration into the global economy, decoupling would be nearly impossible without significant repercussions for both sides.
The West is highly dependent on globalized supply chains, with China as a crucial part, while many Western countries rely heavily on the Chinese market. Losing access to China’s market would be economically intolerable for many Western industries, and even the prospect of such a loss would cause substantial economic shocks.
As a result, Harris is not seeking to upend globalization entirely; in areas deemed low-risk, she would likely continue cooperation with China.
Trump, meanwhile, also cannot afford the impact of a complete economic decoupling from China now. However, he is expected to be more assertive in defending U.S. economic interests.
Trump has indicated plans to impose tariffs as high as 60 percent on all Chinese goods, disregarding any countermeasures from China. This approach, which Harris is unlikely to adopt, would deal a significant blow to China, particularly as it aims to expand exports amid ongoing economic challenges.
Furthermore, Trump’s disregard for climate change would possibly mean a shift in U.S. energy policy, potentially reducing support for renewable energy. This would negatively impact China’s solar and photovoltaic industries, which rely heavily on exports to the rest of the world.
When it comes to China policy, the two parties share a rare consensus: countering the Chinese Communist Party and safeguarding U.S. national interests.
If elected, Trump would likely revive his “America First” approach, deprioritizing alliances. China could leverage this stance to expand its global influence, advancing a multipolar world order and offering economic incentives in exchange for political alignment. Many countries, wary of Trump’s America First policies, might be more receptive to China’s views and, in some cases, gravitate closer to Beijing.
However, in the long run, an America First policy could be beneficial for the U.S. if done right. Globalization has significantly hollowed out U.S. manufacturing, and America’s reliance on allied nations for critical manufacturing has weakened its dominance.
The U.S. must offer substantial benefits to allies to keep them aligned in diplomacy and other policy areas, which is costly. With America’s rising national debt, sustaining this kind of foreign policy model is becoming increasingly challenging. From this perspective, strengthening the U.S. domestically is essential for regaining its power on the world stage.
On Taiwan, China likely views both Trump and Harris with mixed feelings.
Trump’s stance on military intervention is less direct than Biden’s. Biden has repeatedly stated that the U.S. would intervene militarily if China took action against Taiwan. Trump, however, has never made such a clear stance, instead suggesting Taiwan should pay the U.S. for protection and threatening a 150-200 percent tariff on China if it invades Taiwan.
It is uncertain whether Harris would follow Biden’s approach to Taiwan. Harris has generally been more restrained on the issue of military support for Taiwan. In an October 60 Minutes interview with CBS, she declined to discuss “hypotheticals” when asked if the U.S. would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion but said she would ensure that Taiwan has the capability to defend itself.
From an operational standpoint, like other countries that interact with the U.S., China would prefer the U.S. to be more predictable. Biden’s predictability is close to 100 percent, and Harris would likely continue this trend. In contrast, Trump’s policies are harder to foresee. This unpredictability could work to the U.S.’s advantage in a conflict with China.
If Harris follows Biden’s path, focusing on de-escalation, her administration would likely adopt a reactive rather than proactive stance on conflicts. This approach, as seen in Biden’s handling of the Ukraine crisis, involves clearly defining U.S. limits (such as no ground troops) and offering “drip-feed” aid during much of the war period, which has reduced the effectiveness of support.
In contrast, Trump, if he chooses to act, may prefer decisive measures with immediate impact. In a potential Taiwan Strait crisis, Trump would likely respond more quickly and decisively — if he decided to act militarily. However, whether he would choose to act remains a significant question mark.
Simone Gao is an independent journalist. Her website is zoomingin.tv.
