Seventy-nine years ago, Nazi Germany surrendered to the Allies ending World War II in Europe. That war was fought along Clausewitzian lines in which the Allies overwhelmed the Wehrmacht on the battlefield and its bombers obliterated Germany’s industry and economy.
Three months later, this Clausewitzian system and the nature of war would be forever changed.
Two nuclear bombs dropped on Japan in August 1945 produced such shock and awe that a resoundingly defeated society surrendered. But it was thermonuclear weapons — at least 1,000 times more powerful than nuclear weapons — that changed warfare.
For the only time in history, thermonuclear war could produce only losers and no winners. Surviving a first strike with enough remaining weapons to destroy the attacker introduced a state of mutual assured destruction or MAD. War or conflict was possible. But no state was prepared to commit suicide in risking a thermonuclear war.
Today, artificial intelligence and the increasing vulnerabilities of advanced society have produced another tectonic, yet less visible, shift. Instead of destroying an enemy’s ability to wage war, disruption has become a more effective metric of success or failure. That does not mean destruction is no longer relevant. But disruption may be easier, less expensive and more effectively achieved.
The wars in Ukraine and Gaza demonstrate the increasing salience of this notion. Russia’s initial offensive was disrupted and not destroyed as Moscow sought to seize Kyiv in a lightning-fast offensive. Obviously, chaos and attrition followed. But the war was stalemated by disruption.
Consider the combined effects of Hamas’s barbaric Oct. 7 attack, Israel’s response and the disruption that was provoked inside America peaking in late April. Massive protests not seen since the late 1960s and early 1970s over race and Vietnam broke out across America’s colleges and universities in support of Palestine. Inexplicably, there are also protesters blaming Israel instead of Hamas, the terrorist organization that committed premeditated and unspeakable atrocities, for the events of Oct. 7.
How then to transfer this transformation in which disruption and not destruction may have become the primary aim of war into practical action? In my book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New Mad,” I redefined MAD as massive attacks of disruption, adding an extra “D” for destruction.
In this broader context, “MAD(D)” consists of acts of both nature and man. National security cannot ignore this dual source of danger. COVID-19, climate change, famine, floods, extreme storms and other acts of nature are more damaging and destructive than many wars.
Man-made MAD extends beyond the malicious intentions and extremism of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and other adversaries. For the U.S. and Western democracies, a more diabolical form of MAD is a failing government breeding huge public discontent while remaining impervious to corrective action.
Protests over Gaza in the U.S. drive home the government’s failure and impotence to act. As free speech and the rights of protest have been tested to the breaking point, these political strengths have transformed into vulnerabilities. Disrupting these vulnerabilities became an obvious and more effective means to attack the U.S.
Ironically, given this growing power of disruption, is the Constitution, drafted by the best minds of the 18th century, still fit for purpose in the 21st century? And if it is not, does today’s definition of national security need a more comprehensive strategic center of gravity that recognizes failing government as perhaps the most dangerous threat to democracy, probably more than China or Russia?
The problem is that actions to correct this failure of government are extremely difficult to identify and more so to implement.
Prevention, limitation and containment are central to any new national security framework. Regarding China and Russia, the strategy should move to a porcupine defense designed to disrupt an initial attack to make it too costly to contemplate. In Asia, this would mean confining China to the first island chain and rolling up its Belt and Road overseas facilities to deny China foreign access.
In Europe, NATO would focus on exploiting its strategic advantages in the Baltics with the accession of Sweden and the 830-mile Finnish border with Russia. Systems such as these were put to use in Ukraine and are among those NATO should adopt.
This strategy, which I fully defined in “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD,” demands the West gain far greater knowledge and understanding of these conditions.
For Western security to be on solid ground for the long haul, the U.S. and its allies must find a 21st century strategic center of gravity now.
Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” military doctrine. His 12th book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on X @harlankullman.
