In 1977, Ronald Reagan famously commented that he had a clear vision for how the Cold War would end.
“We win,” he said, “and they lose.”
That sort of clarity, even absolutism, fit the times perfectly. It also accurately framed a contest not only between two superpowers, but between two different, even mutually exclusive, worldviews.
One has to wonder what the answer would be — or should be — today as to how the war in Ukraine ends.
I spent the better part of the last two weeks talking with political and business leaders all over Europe and the Middle East. Almost without exception, and without regard to nationality or political persuasion, whenever the question of Ukraine came up, the input I got was surprisingly consistent.
The overwhelming majority of opinions were not “Ukraine wins, Russia loses.” It was the far more nuanced offering that the war would end with Ukraine ceding some portion of territory to Russia permanently — perhaps Donetsk, Donbas, and the southern coast along the Black Sea to Crimea. Occasionally, someone would suggest that Russia might in fact succeed in overrunning the entire country.
But not a single person suggested that Ukraine would be able to fully and permanently expel the Russians from Ukrainian territory. Indeed, I haven’t heard anyone other than the most dedicated Ukrainian patriots and politicians seriously offer that the outcome can be as absolute as Reagan suggested.
If that is correct — if the generally accepted most likely outcome in Ukraine is some sort of partition of the country, with a small risk of a complete Russian victory — then why aren’t we having real discussions now about ending the war?
When Russia invaded more than two years ago, the West was faced with a delicate balancing act. Too little of a response would amount to appeasement, and too much would risk escalation. And both of those outcomes carry tremendous costs. But America and its allies have managed to walk that fine line with some success. Through a combination of military support (without direct intervention) and economic sanctions, the message has become clear to the Russians. There is a real cost to what they have done, and it is enormous.
While there are valid debates to be had as to the specifics (have the sanctions been severe enough?), the Kremlin has already gotten the message loud and clear. Beijing has also certainly watched closely to calculate the price — especially the economic price — that comes with hostile military expansionism.
The argument can be made that, by acting as it has, the West has taken the issue of appeasement off the table, and not just in Europe.
But the risk of escalation is still very real. And that carries potential costs at least as severe as appeasement.
France is now considering sending French troops — under the pretense of being “advisers” — to the front. And the U.S. recently explicitly endorsed the use of Western armaments on certain limited targets inside Russia. It doesn’t take many anticipated moves down the chessboard to see how actions like those increase the risk of the war spilling over outside the current boundaries.
At the same time, it is hard to argue that those moves by France and the U.S. increase the likelihood of an outright Ukrainian victory. Although Western military hardware and logistical support can empower Ukraine, the country probably lacks the basic manpower to expel Russian forces. Put another way: The West can and should help Ukraine defend itself, but nothing short of a full boots-on-the-ground military intervention can drive the Russians out.
The recent moves by France, the U.S., and others seem more likely to reaffirm the outcome that seems to be so widely, if privately, expected — that things are simply moving toward a stalemate.
If that is where so many people, in so many national capitals, from so many political persuasions, think the war in Ukraine is headed, then why are we prolonging things? Where are the calls for a ceasefire, or peace talks? Who is broaching the topic with Volodymyr Zelensky or Vladimir Putin?
The next skirmish outside of Kharkiv is not likely to lead to the expulsion of Russian troops. It is only more likely to cement the stalemate. And it carries with it the nonzero possibility of escalation and further human suffering.
I have heard several experts suggest that, generally, peace talks do not begin until both sides believe they have a better outcome available at the table than they do in the field. That sounds like an accurate reading of history. I suppose the recent moves by France and the U.S. could be arguably intended to change the Russians’ calculations about where their best deal lies. As it takes two to talk, however, one is left to wonder whether we are trying to convince the Ukrainians of the same.
I don’t like that Russian forces are in Ukraine, nor do I welcome the prospect of them staying there. But it may well be that that die was cast when the West yawned in response to the 2014 invasion of Crimea.
Today, the choices in Ukraine seem to be between a peace involving territorial concessions to Russia, a complete Ukrainian collapse, a permanent state of war, or an escalation. Out of those, the first keeps looking like the least bad option.
Mick Mulvaney, a former congressman from South Carolina, is a contributor to NewsNation. He served as director of the Office of Management and Budget, acting director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and White House chief of staff under President Donald Trump.
